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Abstract
I model journal pricing behavior in a portfolio demand environment and consider how the
ongoing transition from print to digital distribution has lead to endogenous changes in pricing
behavior. Specifically, when choosing whether or not to price discriminate, publishers
compare the benefits of selling more content to each set of buyers against the associated
additional costs. As the distribution costs decline, price discrimination becomes more
attractive. However, since this cost decline also creates new entry opportunities, incumbent
firms may also need to bundle their journals to avoid displacement of individual titles.
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URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume12/EB−04L00003A.pdf1 Both Chuang and Sirbu and Fay and Mackie-Mason (FMM) model final consumer demand for
an N-good bundle(s) of articles or information goods.  They assume that users rank each article in
decreasing order of preference, and in the case of FMM, that articles sold by different firms are imperfect
substitutes.  Then given prices, consumers maximize their surplus.  In this paper I specifically model the
demand behavior of libraries.  Although libraries do rank journals according to value/cost ratios,  my
approach incorporates additional elements: a library budget constraint and an outside good, i.e.
monographs.
1. Introduction
The principal buyers of academic journals – research libraries – attempt to assemble
broadly-defined journal collections.  Although this portfolio approach to journal acquisition
allows a community of scholars to share copies and reduce transaction costs, it also suggests that
demand substitution between journals is constrained.  For example, rather than choosing a
handful of the available economics journals, most research libraries try to purchase dozens, and
sometime hundreds of these titles (since from a user’s perspective articles in one title are, at best,
very imperfect substitutes for those appearing in other journals).  The purpose of this note is to
model journal pricing behavior in this demand environment and to consider how the ongoing
transition from print to digital distribution has lead to endogenous changes in pricing behavior.   
Specifically, when choosing whether or not to price discriminate, publishers compare the benefits
of selling more content to each set of buyers against the associated additional costs.  As the
distribution costs decline, price discrimination becomes more attractive.  However, since this cost
decline also creates new entry opportunities, incumbent firms may also need to bundle their
journals to avoid displacement of individual titles.  In recent years, this shift in strategy has been
implemented by major commercial journal publishers (see Frazier 2001). 
The scholarly journals market has received modest attention in the economics literature. 
Ordover and Willig (1978), Phillips and Phillips (2002), and Issman-Weit and Shy (2003) model
the pricing of a single print journal to institutional and individual subscribers.  Bergstrom (2001)
discusses how the demand aggregation facilitated by libraries increases the profitability of an
individual title and reduces user surplus.  Chuang and Sirbu (1999) also consider the case of a
single journal but in a digital environment.   Given the lower transaction costs associated with this
new environment, they demonstrate that mixed bundling (sales of individual articles as well as the
“bundled” journal) can be a profit-maximizing strategy.  Fay and Mackie-Mason (1999) extend
Chuang and Sirbu’s demand framework to allow for competition between bundles of information
goods.
1  They compare the profitability and welfare properties of bundling in the monopoly and
duopoly cases.  In both of these  papers, the analytical difficulties posed by the “N-good”
bundling problem lead to simplifying assumptions, e.g. firms sell either one bundle containing all
N goods and/or each of the individual goods, there is no price discrimination (and  bundle
components share a common price if sold separately), and the use of numerical methods is
necessary to generate results.  The two papers that are closest in spirit to the approach adopted
here are McCabe (2003) and Jeon and Menicucci (2003).  Like this paper, McCabe examines the
impact of a decline in distribution costs on publisher pricing strategies.  However, since library
preferences are assumed to be lexicographic, no unique equilibria can be identified.   Jeon and2  Mixed bundling is not considered here for two reasons.  First, because I assume that libraries’
valuations for journals are positively correlated, the standard motivation for mixed bundling – negative
correlation in consumer valuations – is absent.  Second, the ability to price discriminate in this paper
satisfies the same objective as mixed bundling does in Chuang and Sirbu (1999), and Fay and Mackie-
Mason (1999).  That is, in both of those papers, mixed bundling permits firms to set different prices for
high and low demand buyers.   Here, price discrimination allows publishers to set prices based on library
budgets. 
3 In JM’s model, bundling may result in the foreclosure of incumbent titles as well.  This
difference arises from their assumption that libraries compare the net surplus of various bundles in
making acquisition decisions. 
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Menicucci (JM) focus on the digital environment and assume that libraries allocate their budgets
across both journals and monographs.  This latter assumption generates unique equilibria. 
However, when JM compare the profitability of unbundled and bundled journals sales the
underlying equilibria are based on different decision criteria.  When journals are sold separately,
JM assume that libraries compare the “surplus-price ratio” of each journal, i.e. they purchase
those titles with the highest  use value per dollar.  In contrast, when each publisher sells a single
journal bundle, JM assume that libraries compare the net surplus associated with each bundle, i.e.
use value minus the bundle price.  This latter assumption is inconsistent with the library science
literature and my own discussions with librarians (See McCabe, 2002).  It implies that libraries
are willing to pay more per unit of use value for a  journal bundle whose overall value is
relatively large.
In contrast,  this paper relies exclusively on the use value per dollar approach for
modeling the behavior of libraries.  Given this demand framework, I demonstrate that the
desirability of price discrimination depends on the magnitude of the distribution costs.  In
particular, when these costs are relatively high, a monopoly publisher prefers not to price
discriminate (the “print regime”); when these costs are low, price discrimination is more desirable
(the “digital regime”).
2  In my model, bundling is important only as an entry foreclosure device.
3 
When marginal costs are low, entry by new, lower quality titles may be profitable. Bundling by
the incumbent firm can foreclose entry in these circumstances.  For example, if entry would
displace an incumbent’s title, then bundling can be an effective defense if the publisher’s journal
portfolio is sufficiently valuable.
This note is organized as follows.  I first describe the basic journal pricing model and then
use it to analyze each of the two distribution regimes.  I then compare the two regimes and
identify the cost conditions under which each is observed.  Next, I allow for entry.  I conclude
with a brief discussion of the results and their relationship to developments in the market for
scientific journals. In the appendix I construct a numerical example which further illuminates the
results. 4 To derive an analytic result for the libraries’ problem, it is necessary to make this assumption. 
Nonetheless, in equilibrium, all active titles, except possibly one lowest-quality title, are fully purchased,
i.e. xij = 1. In reality, though  most library journal purchases are for complete subscriptions, it is common
practice for libraries to purchase individual articles from publishers when scholars request research from
journals not otherwise available in their institution’s library.  I consider this issue further in the Appendix.
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2. The Basic Model
I consider two journal distribution regimes: 1. No price discrimination (the “print
regime”), and 2. (Perfect) Price discrimination (the “digital regime”). In each case, given price
and quality information for some set of journals, I assume that libraries allocate their fixed
budgets between journals and monographs.  In the print regime, libraries maximize the following
objective function:
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obtains from journal i that is sold by publisher j, xij is a continuous variable in the interval [0,1]
that represents the fraction of journal ij purchased by library z 
4;  v(m) is the utility from spending
m on monographs, v(0) = 0,  vN (m) > 0 > vNN(m);  Mz is library z’s total budget for journals and pij
is journal ij’s price.  I assume that vN (m) > 1 for all m # Mz .  Thus, libraries prefer exhausting
their budgets.  Initially, I assume that Mz can take just one value; this is later relaxed.  The number
of libraries equals Nz.  In the digital case, (1) changes slightly.  Since each firm sells a single
bundle, the i subscript is suppressed and thus, for example, uj , corresponds to the utility obtained




To simplify the presentation, I assume that two journals are potentially active and that a
single monopolist controls both titles.  Initially, I assume that entry is blocked.  The production
costs for each title include a fixed cost, F (the “first copy cost”), and a constant distribution cost,
c, per subscription.  A journal is active if its owner decides to invest F.  Let N  denotes the
number of publishers with active titles, and nj the number of active journals for firm j (j = 1...N). 
Thus, in the base model, N=1 and nj=2. 
The game played by market participants consists of four periods.  In the first period, the
monopolist decides, for each of its two titles, whether to expend F, the first copy cost.  In the
second period, subscription prices are selected for the active titles.  Libraries then make their
purchase decisions and, finally, the monopolist publishes its titles. Since sales can be forecast
perfectly at the end of the second period, I focus on the first two periods of the game.  JM’s
proposition 1 describes a unique SPNE for a similar game involving unbundled journals.  In their
setup, publishers first decide whether to enter or not, and then determine prices for their
respective titles; finally, libraries maximize (1) subject to their budget constraint.
Let   Under the assumption of zero fixed and marginal costs,  JM show (in Uu j j
N
= ∑ .
their prop 1) that a unique NE exists in prices in the second period of their model: p
*
ij = "
*uij,5 If  u11 … u21, then the publisher needs to consider which pricing strategy maximizes profits, i.e.
should the high quality title be sold to all libraries, etc.  The optimal strategy depends on the model
parameters.  See the numerical example in the appendix.
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where "
* is the unique solution to 
1/" = v’(Mz – "U).    (2)
Note that the general form of (2) reflects the familiar Kuhn-Tucker solution to the maximization
problem described by (1).   This result is quite intuitive.  Journal prices are linearly related to their
underlying use value or utility.  And the ratio of a journal’s use value to price is determined by
the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on monographs.  In other words, libraries compare the
“cost” of each unit of journal use value and spend their budget on the cheapest units available. 
This result constitutes an equilibrium because, on one hand, cutting a journal’s price does not
increase sales (only one copy of each journal is purchased), and, on the other hand, increasing its
price results in more spending on monographs and less on the deviating title.
However, since JM assume that both fixed and marginal publishing costs are zero their
approach cannot account for the changes in price strategies that have been observed during the
transition from print to digital distribution, i.e. the shift to price discrimination. Their assumption
of zero costs implies that a multi-journal publisher will always prefer to sell its entire portfolio
(bundled or not) to every customer. If library budgets vary, this can be accomplished via perfect
price discrimination (see footnote 7 for why 1
st degree price discrimination is feasible). The
intuition is that a publisher can maximize its share of a given customer’s budget by offering as
much content as possible.  And since costs are zero, this strategy is profit maximizing.
3. The Print Regime (no price discrimination)
Suppose now that Mz can now take one of two values: small (z=S) or large (z=L), and that
the numbers of libraries with budgets equal to MS and ML are NS and NL, respectively, with NS >
NL.  I show in section (5) that price discrimination is not profit maximizing for values of c greater
than some c
* (>0) where c
* is determined by v(m), MZ, and the ui.   The intuition is that although
selling more titles to a given set of libraries increases the journals’ share of the libraries’ budgets
it also increases the total distribution costs.  When c exceeds c*,  profits are greater when each
title has a single price, and these prices are set so that one title is purchased by all libraries, and
the other is bought by a subset of libraries, i.e. the large budget libraries (note that this
“diversified” equilibrium corresponds to observed practice in the pre-digital era.).  The second
title is purchased by only a subset of libraries because the cost of both titles exceeds MS and/or the
addition of more monographs produces greater utility.
Suppose that c > c
*, and that u11 = u21.
5   For the title sold by the firm to all libraries,
profits are 
              (3) Π 11 11
All
SL pcNN F =− ⋅ +− [( ) ( )] ,6 Note that a necessary condition for existence of this equilibrium is  $ , i.e. large budget α L
* α S
*
libraries pay (weakly) more for the titles that they alone purchase.  
7 In the digital regime publishers use IP addresses to prevent arbitrage.   Furthermore, to
discriminate publishers do not need to rely on self-selection (and thus incentive compatibility constraints). 
Library budgets are public information (See footnote 10 in the Appendix). Note that if individual library
data was not available, publishers might engage in 2
nd degree price discrimination.  To do so,  publishers
could create a set of distinct bundles with varying content.  In the current case, there would be two
bundles: one would be purchased by all libraries and consist of a single title, and the second would
contain both titles.  The prices for the first and second bundle would correspond to those defined earlier in
section 3: p11, and p11 + p21, respectively.  Alternatively,  publishers could sell unbundled titles and use the
pricing strategy described in section 3.
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and is defined by (2) when  M = MS  and U = u1 1.    Similarly, for the title sold pu S 11 11 =⋅ α
* , α S
*
only to large budget libraries profits are
              (4) Π 21 21
Le
L pc N F
arg [( ) ] , =− ⋅ −
  and   is defined by (2)  when m = ML –  p1 1 – "LU  and  U = u2 1 .
6  pu L 21 21 =⋅ α
* , α L
*
Finally, note that with high distribution costs, bundling offers no advantages.  Since the
monopolist’s revenue is proportional to U, bundling is helpful only if entry is deterred (in (2),
note that " is declining in U).  But by assumption,  entry is not possible.
4.  Digital Regime Case (perfect price discrimination)
If c < c
* and price discrimination is preferred by firms, condition (2) can be applied directly to
both classes of libraries.  In the price discrimination, no bundling case (“PD”), since each journal
is sold to each type of library, each set of customers can be analyzed separately.  For each value
of M, a unique " can be determined, and thus prices will differ across the two types of libraries
(in the numerical example contained in the appendix , d"/dM > 0, and so prices are higher for
larger budget libraries).
7  The monopolist’s  profits can be expressed as   where ΠΠ Π 11 12 1
PD PD PD =+
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similarly but note that, unlike the print-regime case,  M = ML. 
In the price discrimination, bundling case (“B”), prices are defined in a similar fashion. 
Because each firm sells a single product,  profits for firm j can be expressed more compactly as 8 It is reasonable to assume that NS is several times larger than NL (see footnote 10).  Also, in the
numerical example presented in the appendix, the functional form chosen for v(m) implies that 
.   pp pp p
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 where    u1 = u11 + u21 ,  and  is defined by (2)  when  M = MS , and  pu
Small
S 11 =⋅ α
* , α S
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schemes  (since   and ).  However, this claim is not ppp
Small Small Small
11 1 2 1 =+ ppp
Le Le Le
11 1 2 1
arg arg arg =+
necessarily true if entry is permitted.
5. Comparing the Two Regimes
Do publishers prefer to price discriminate or not?  All else equal, this decision is
influenced by the magnitude of marginal costs.  This can be seen by comparing profits for our
monopolist under the two regimes (in the digital case, to simplify the analysis, I assume that the
titles are bundled).  If profits in the digital case exceed the corresponding profits in the print case,
i.e.,  then using (3), (4), and (6),  I can solve for the critical marginal cost,  ΠΠ Π 11 12 1
BA l l L e ≥+
arg ,
c
*, below the monopolist prefers to price discriminate and bundle: 
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The intuition for why lower values of c improve the  relative attractiveness of the digital regime is
that price discrimination increases the customer base for journal 2.  Under the print regime it is
sold only to large budget libraries; in the digital case all libraries purchase it.  If c is too large,
according to (7), the marginal revenue generated by price discrimination is exceeded by the
additional costs. To check whether the print case is actually profitable for values of c in the
interval (p1j , c
*], note that the first term inside the brackets on the right hand side of (7) is likely
to be much larger than the second term. 
8  Thus,  c
* .  And since I assume that pp
Small
11 1 0 −> .
vNN(m) < 0, this implies that or c
* < p11 (< p21). This latter inequality insures that the pp
Small
11 1 2 < ,
print case is profitable,  provided that F is not too large.
6. Entry
Now consider the same basic setup with the possibility of entry.  Each entrant title is
assumed to exhibit lower quality than one of the monopolist’s titles.  There are n potential
entrants, each with quality uE (< ui1).
Suppose c > c
*.  Average costs are “high” and I assume that entry is not profitable for one
or more entrants when the monopolist’s titles are active.  That is, given v(m),  Mz and U for either
set of  libraries, the price determined by (2) for any entrant title is insufficient to cover its average9 In addition to the Economics Bulletin, other examples of this phenomenon include the Public
Library of Science (plos.org), and Biomed Central (biomedcentral.com).
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costs.  Thus, the level of U observed in equilibrium is necessarily less than or equal to the level
observed when costs are zero.   Only the highest quality titles are published.
Suppose 0 < c < c
*.  I assume that entry is profitable for values of c below some threshold
level within this interval, and that the actual value of c is below this threshold.  Furthermore,
assume that entry is not profitable for any title unless one of the incumbent titles is displaced (this
assumption simplifies the analysis; if entry is otherwise profitable for one or more titles, then
bundling does not always increase profits).  Suppose that titles are not bundled and that the
aggregate quality of the potential entrants exceeds that of one of the incumbent’s titles,  i.e.
  Then entry will be successful and a (lower) value incumbent title will uu uu E
n
i 11 21 1 1 +> ≥ ∑ .
exit.  As a consequence,  each library enjoys a higher level of utility (increasing U always raises
utility if prices satisfy (2)).  However, if the monopolist bundles its titles, then displacement of the
its bundle lowers utility since the entrant set is less valuable than the monopolist’s bundle.  Entry
is blocked.
7. Final Remarks
The note models the pricing behavior of journal publishers in a portfolio demand
environment.  I show that a decline in distribution costs can result in an endogenous change in
pricing strategies, namely a shift from  non- discriminatory pricing (the “print regime”) to price
discrimination and possibly bundling (the “digital regime”).  As described in the Appendix, this
shift can improve aggregate consumer welfare since small budget libraries can afford to purchase
more titles.  However, in the digital environment, incumbent publishers may choose to bundle to
deter entry and thus limit the welfare gains.
There are a variety of directions for future research.  For example, I have assumed here
that journal publishers cover their costs by collecting revenue from libraries.  In response to the
opportunities offered by the internet (and the entry-deterring effect of bundling by major
publishers),  new entrants have begun to adopt an “open access” business model in which online
access is free, and revenues are generated by author fees and advertising.
9  It would be useful to
endogenize pricing along these several dimensions of the journal market, and explore the
implications for market evolution and welfare, e.g. should we expect both of these “business 
models” to coexist, or is it more likely that one will prove dominant? Which outcome is best ,
 from the perspective of publishers, the scientific community, etc.?  See McCabe and Snyder
(2004) for an examination of some of these questions. 8
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Appendix
A.  Fractional Journal Purchases
JM are able to demonstrate that (2) is a unique equilibrium by allowing for the possibility
of fractional journal purchases.  This assumption is used in two ways.  First,  JM show that each
publisher’s profits are maximized if all of its titles exhibit the same u/p ratio. In some cases, this
may require partial purchases of the lowest-quality title in the population (lemmas 2 and 3 in
JM’s proposition 1); note that full subscriptions are purchased for all other titles, i.e. xij = 1.  
Second, since (2) requires that all titles exhibit the same u/p ratio, if “high” prices are observed
for one or more titles, libraries must be able to spend less on the deviating titles while increasing
their purchases of monographs (lemma 4).  
As I indicated in footnote 4, libraries do have the option to purchase individual journal
articles.  Typically, the corresponding prices are higher than implied by the journal subscription
price.  Although this fact is closest in spirit to JM’s second use of the fractional assumption, there
is nothing in their proposition 1 that rules out a high price in the first case.  In the current
application, it is easy to see that use of the fractional assumption in the print case introduces  no
complications.  Any article prices higher than implied by the journal subscription price satisfy the
requirements of JM’s proposition.  However, in the digital, bundled case, the threat of entry
requires an additional condition.  Specifically, prices for digital articles must be set so that, in
equilibrium, libraries prefer to purchase a publisher’s bundle rather than substituting the entrant
titles and a subset of the bundle’s articles.  
B.  A Numerical Example
Consider the following numerical example, in which a monopoly publisher sells two titles 
to small and large budget libraries.  Let NS=1000,  NL=250,  MS=10, ML=25, F=$600, c = $2 or 0, v(m)
= MZ@ ln(m), and  u11 = 20 and u21 = 10 .
10  Initially, entry is not feasible.  With these parameter
values, the monopolist’s profit-maximizing strategy,  subject to the constraint of no price
discrimination, involves setting prices so that title 1(u11 = 20) is purchased by all libraries and title
2  (u21 = 10) is bought only by the largest budget libraries.  The cost threshold defined by (7)
equals $1.27.  Suppose c=$2.  In the unbundled, non-discriminatory print equilibrium, the prices
(profits) for titles 1 and 2 are $6.67 ($5233) and $5.24 ($210), respectively.  In the corresponding
digital case (with price discrimination and bundling), the monopolist total profits are less ($4709). 
Bundle prices for the small and large budget libraries equal $7.5 and $13.64, respectively.  If c is10
lowered to zero, duopolist profits for the digital case equals $9709, and $8443 in the print regime. 
Thus, the drop in marginal costs leads to a switch in the preferred pricing strategy.   This switch
also increases aggregate library utility.  Despite their fixed budgets, (gross) utility for each small
budget library increases about 53% because they now purchase all active titles; utility for the
larger libraries declines about 3% because their cost of purchasing all titles increases about 14%;
monograph expenditures decline by 25%  and 13%, respectively, for the small and large libraries.
Now suppose that entry is feasible and that the set of entrants consists of 5 titles, each with
a utility value of 2+, where 1 >> , > 0.  Given these parameter values, entry is not profitable in
the scenarios described above; however, when c=0, if the incumbents did not bundle in the digital
regime, then title 2 would be displaced (since the aggregate utility value of the entrants exceeds
the value of this title). 